Abstract We consider communication situations games being the combination of a TU-game and a communication graph. We study the average tree (AT) solutions introduced by Herings et al. [9] and [10] . The AT solutions are defined with respect to a set, say T , of rooted spanning trees of the communication graph. We characterize these solutions by efficiency, linearity and an axiom of T -hierarchy. Then we prove the following results. Firstly, the AT solution with respect to T is a Harsanyi solution if and only if T is a subset of the set of trees introduced in [10] . Secondly, the latter set is constructed by the classical DFS algorithm and the associated AT solution coincides with the Shapley value when the communication graph is complete. Thirdly, the AT solution with respect to trees constructed by the other classical algorithm BFS yields the equal surplus division when the communication graph is complete.
Introduction
Game theoretical models regularly address the problem of cooperative behavior assuming that every agent is an autonomous acting individual. Under this assumption, every group of individuals has to be regarded as a formable coalition. If one discards the assumption that individuals are completely free in forming coalitions, one arrives at refinements which incorporate certain constraints in coalition formation. Examples are games with permission structures (Gilles et al. [6] ), games with precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern [5] ) and games on regular systems (Lange and Grabisch [12] ). Such constraints can also be motivated by restrictions on communication. Myerson [15] is the first to model this feature by an undirected graph that describes the limited communication possibilities open to the agents. In his model, a coalition can only form if it is connected, i.e. if its members can communicate without the help of outside individuals. The combination of a cooperative game and a communication graph is called a communication situation.
This article studies solutions for communication situations. One such solution, called the average tree solution, has been recently introduced and characterized by Herings et al. [9] and Herings et al. [10] . As for the Shapley value (Shapley, [16] ) for cooperative games with transferable utilities, this solution relies on specific marginal contribution vectors. Nevertheless, instead of considering orderings on the set of the agents, Herings et al. [9] construct rooted spanning trees that induce partial orders on the set of agents. Each rooted spanning tree can be seen as a communication hierarchy that singles out a unique agent, called the root, and assigns to each other agent a unique superior.
1 Any agent can communicate with the root by communicating iteratively with superiors. The more intermediary agents necessary to communicate with the root, the more delegated the communication hierarchy. The simplest communication hierarchies are the standard principal-agent model in which the principal is the root and is the unique superior of any other agent, and the chain that totally orders the agents. These types of communication hierarchies are the least and most delegated respectively.
A solution is called an average tree solution if it is the average of the contribution vectors over a nonempty set of rooted spanning trees. Herings et al. [9] restrict their analysis to cycle-free communication situations and consider the set of all rooted spanning trees. They show that the corresponding average tree solution is the only component efficient solution such that deleting a link between two agents yields for both resulting components the same average change in allocation, where the average is taken over the agents in the component. For arbitrary communication graph, Herings et al. [10] construct a specific set of admissible rooted spanning trees. The induced average tree solution coincides with the Shapley value when the underlying graph is complete and with the average tree solution as defined by Herings et al. [9] when the underlying graph is cycle-free.
In this article, we extend the work of Herings et al. [10] by allowing any nonempty set of rooted spanning trees T in the definition of the average tree solution. Our main objectives are to study the distribution of the Harsanyi dividends and to highlight a connection between communication hierarchies introduced in [10] and tree-growing algorithms. As a preliminary result, we provide the first characterization of the average tree solution for arbitrary communication situations. This result relies on the classical axioms of component efficiency and linearity, and on a hierarchical axiom. This third axiom states that for unanimity games, the difference of allocation between two agents is explained by the number of times their positions are decisive in a set of rooted spanning tree. From this characterization, we obtain a useful expression of the average tree solution. This expression is used to show that the average tree solution with respect to T is a Harsanyi solution (see van den Brink et al. [19] ) if and only if T is a subset of the set introduced in [10] .
Then, we study the connections between the average tree solutions and two well-known tree-growing algorithms called DFS (for Depth-First Search) and BFS (for Breadth-First Search) respectively. Such algorithms explore the communication graph so as to construct rooted spanning trees by growing a tree, one agent and one link at a time. In DFS, agents are explored out of the most recently visited agent who still has unvisited neighbors. Thus, the rooted spanning trees constructed by DFS are the most delegated communication hierarchies of a communication graph. Algorithm BFS systematically explores the links of the graph in order to visits every unexplored agent that is reachable from an initial agent. Therefore, BFS constructs the most centralized communication hierarchies of a graph. We prove that the set of trees in [10] is constructed by DFS and that the associated average tree solution coincides with the Shapley value when the communication graph is complete. We also show that the average tree solution with respect to trees constructed by BFS yields the equal surplus division when the communication graph is complete. In a sense, the difference between the Shapley value and the equal surplus division can be seen as a difference between delegated and and centralized communication hierarchies. While this difference is highlighted by comparable axiomatic characterizations in van den Brink [18] , it is illustrated in terms of circulation of the information through a communication hierarchy in this article. This aspect is discussed in the last section of the article.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the definitions and notations. The axiomatic characterization of the average tree solutions is given in section 3. The results on the distribution of Harsanyi dividends are proved in section 4. We point out the connection between the average tree solutions and tree-growing algorithms in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries

TU-games
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A cooperative game with transferable utility on N , or simply TU-game, is a characteristic function v : 2 N −→ R such that v(∅) = 0. For each S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S. The set of all TU-games on N is denoted by Γ N . A TU-game v ∈ Γ N is additive if v(S) = i∈S v({i}) for any nonempty S ∈ 2 N . A payoff vector x ∈ R n is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff x i ∈ R to each player i ∈ N . A solution on Γ N is a function f : Γ N −→ R n that assigns a payoff vector f (v) ∈ R n to each v ∈ Γ N . For any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}, the unanimity game u S is given by u S (T ) = 1 if T ⊇ S and u S (T ) = 0 otherwise. It is well-known that the collection of unanimity games forms a basis for Γ N . Hence for each TU-game v ∈ Γ N we have v = S∈2 N \{∅} ∆ v (S)u S , where the coefficients ∆ v (S) are called the Harsanyi dividends of v, see Harsanyi [8] .
A well-studied solution on Γ N is the Shapley value (Shapley [16] ). An ordering is a bijective function π on N , where π(i) is the player at position i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in π. For any ordering π on N define S π i = {π(1), π(2), . . . , π(i)} and
The Shapley value is the solution Sh that assigns to each TU-game v ∈ Γ N the average of all n! marginal contribution vectors m π (v):
Another solution on Γ N is the equal surplus division ESD, which first assigns to each player i ∈ N his stand-alone payoff v({i}) and then distributes the remainder of v(N ) equally among all players in N :
Communication situations
An undirected graph is a pair (N, L) where N is a set of nodes and L is a collection of
For ease of notation we write ij instead of {i, j}. For each S ⊆ N , L(S) = {ij : i ∈ S, j ∈ S} is the set of links between nodes of S. The graph (S, L(S)) is the subgraph of (N, L) induced by S. A sequence of distinct nodes (
The combination of a TU-game and of a communication graph is a so-called communication situation (Myerson [15] [2] . It follows that:
In this article, we consider the solutions f on some classes of communication
N . We are interested in the class of Harsanyi solutions, introduced by Vasil'ev [21] for TU-games and studied by van den Brink et al. [19] for communication situations. A Harsanyi solution distributes the Harsanyi dividends to the players of the corresponding coalitions according to a sharing function which assigns to each coalition S a sharing vector specifying for each player in S its share in the dividend of S. A sharing function on N is a function z which
The Harsanyi solution on C with respect to z, denoted by f z , is defined as:
2.3 The average tree solutions
Demange [4] adapts the marginal contribution vector m π for TU-games in the context of communication situations by considering rooted spanning trees instead of orderings on the player set. First, for each component K of a graph (N, L), a spanning tree on K is a tree on K. A rooted spanning tree on K is a directed graph that arises from this spanning tree by selecting a player r ∈ K, called the root, and directing all links away from the root. For a given spanning tree on K, each player r ∈ K is the root of exactly one rooted spanning tree denoted by t r . For each t r and each j ∈ K\{r}, there is exactly one directed link (i, j). Player i is the unique predecessor of j and j is a successor of i in t r . Denote by s r (i) the possibly empty set of successors of player i ∈ K in t r . A player j is a subordinate of i in t r if there is a directed path from i to j, i.e. if there is a sequence of distinct players (i 1 , . . . , i k ) such that i 1 = i, i k = j, and, for each q = 1, . . . , k − 1, i q+1 ∈ s r (i q ). The set S r (i) denotes the union of all subordinates of i in t r and {i}.
For each communication situation (v, L), each K ∈ N/L and each rooted spanning tree t r on K, Demange [4] defines the marginal vector as:
The marginal vector (5) is axiomatized by van den Brink et al.
[20] for linegraph communication situations and by Khmelnitskaya [11] for forest-graph communication situations. Both articles also study economic applications. Herings et al. [9] introduce and characterize the average tree solution AT, a solu-
and to each i ∈ K the average of his contribution (5) over all the |K| rooted spanning trees induced by (K, L(K)):
Herings et al. [10] extend the definition of the average tree solution to arbitrary communication situations. For each graph, they consider a particular collection of rooted spanning trees which is presented and characterized in section 4.2. We consider a further extension by allowing any nonempty set of rooted spanning trees. Because the marginal vector (5) can be decomposed by the components of a graph, there is no loss of generality to focus on the class C N of all communication situations with a connected communication graph. Also define a function T that assigns to each connected graph (N, L) a nonempty set T (L) of rooted spanning trees on N . The average tree solution AT T (v, L) with respect to T on C N is defined as:
3 Axiomatic characterization
Various characterizations of the average tree solution on the class forest-graph communication situations have been provided recently by Herings et al. [9] , Mishra and Talman [14] and Béal et al. [1] . In this section we provide the first characterization the average tree solutions given by (7) on the class C N . We consider four axioms. The first two axioms are standard.
The third axiom states that the solution should give to each player his
In order to state the fourth axiom, let T (L) be a nonempty set of rooted spanning trees associated with the communication graph of a communication situation (v, L) ∈ C N . For each S ∈ 2 N \{∅} and each t r ∈ T (L) denote the smallest subtree of t r that contains S by t r (S) and its subroot by i tr(S) . If S is a connected coalition in t r , then t r (S) is the subtree of t r induced by S and so its subroot belongs to S. For a given function T , define function
(L) is equal to the average number of times player i is the subroot of a subtree that contains S among trees in
The fourth axiom states that the difference of allocation in (u S , L) between two players i and j is only explained by the difference between h
This axiom is inspired by the hierarchical strength axiom introduced by Faigle and Kern [5] in order to characterize a Shapley value for cooperative games with precedence constraints. The first result shows that a solution satisfying linearity and the inessential restricted game property assigns the same payoff vector to the communication situations (v, L) and (v L , L).
Proposition 1 If a solution f on C N satisfies linearity and the inessential restricted game property, then for each
L is additive. Therefore the inessential restricted game property
and
The next result proves that for a given function T , AT T is the unique solution on C N that satisfies efficiency, linearity and T -hierarchy.
Theorem 1 For each function T , the average tree solution AT
T is the unique solution on C N that satisfies efficiency, linearity and T -hierarchy.
Proof. First we prove uniqueness of the solution. So, consider any function T and consider any solution f on C N that satisfies efficiency, linearity and T -hierarchy. Pick any (v, L) ∈ C N and any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}.
. Combining this equation with the T -hierarchy axiom, we first get for each
is determined in a unique way. Second, we show that for any function T , the average tree solution AT T (v, L) given by (7) satisfies the three axioms. Fix any (v, L) ∈ C N . Efficiency For each t r ∈ T (L), the vector m tr is efficient (see Theorem 3.7 in Herings et al. [9] ). Thus the average tree solution AT T satisfies efficiency. Linearity The average tree solution is linear as the average of |T (L)| contribution vectors. T -hierarchy Pick any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}, any i ∈ N and any t r ∈ T (L). Observe the following two facts:
2. If i = i tr(S) , then S r (i) ⊇ S and so u S (S r (i)) = 1. Because t r (S) is the smallest subtree of t r that contains S, we have S r (j) ⊇ S and so u S (S r (j)) = 0 for each j ∈ s r (i). Hence, m
N \{∅} and each i ∈ N , facts 1. and 2. imply that
so that for any i ∈ N and any j ∈ N , the equality h
By linearity, AT
T on C N can be written as follows:
In order to determine whether AT T is a Harsanyi solution, we provide an alternative expression of this solution. For any T , it is easy to see that AT T satisfies linearity and the inessential restricted game property.
For any t r ∈ T (L) and any i ∈ N we have:
so that (7) ensures that the axiom is satisfied. Therefore, we can use the previous results obtained in this section to prove the following statement.
Corollary 1 For any T , AT
Moreover, AT T is a Harsanyi solution on C N if and only if, for each connected graph (N, L) and each S ∈ C(L), it holds that
Proof. Fix a function T and any (v, L) ∈ C N . By linearity of AT T and
satisfies the inessential restricted game property, the equality AT
follows from Proposition 1. From the proof of Theorem 1 we have, for each S ∈ 2 N \{∅}, AT
and AT T i (u S , L) = 0 otherwise, which proves the first part of the result. The moreover part follows from expressions (4) and definition (9) of AT T .
In the next two sections we will expose the properties on T such that the condition D(h T ,S (L)) ⊆ S for each connected graph (N, L) and each S ∈ C(L) is met. Before concluding this section, it is interesting to illustrate why expressions (8) and (9) coincide. In (8), AT
T is obtained by summing on the set of all coalitions and considering coefficients of v. In (9) the sum is computed on the smaller set of all connected coalitions, but with coefficients of v L : the changes in coefficients between games v L and v compensate the smaller number of arguments in the sum. As an example, consider the player set N = {1, 2, 3} and the communication situation (v, L) ∈ C N such that:
and L = {12, 23}. Assume that T (L) contains all the three rooted spanning trees of (N, L). Then we have: for the disconnected coalition {1, 3} to which he does not belong. While this coalition has no dividend in v L , it has a dividend of 3 in v. Therefore, player 2 does not benefit anymore from the share 1/3 of the dividend 3 when AT is computed from the dividends of v L . However the reduction of the worth of {1, 3} in v L also increases the dividend of coalition N in v L of the same amount, which compensates exactly the loss of player 2 on the dividend of coalition {1, 3}. Formally, AT 2 (v, L) is:
and is equal AT 2 (v L , L):
Distribution of the Harsanyi dividends
For simplicity, we assume that the communication graph is connected. We first recall the expression of the average tree solution for tree-graph communication situations provided by Herings et al. [9] in terms of distribution of the Harsanyi dividends of the restricted game. Then we consider the set of rooted spanning trees introduced by Herings et al. [10] in their extension of the average tree solution to arbitrary communication situations. We provide a characterization of this set and use it to prove that the average tree solution AT T is a Harsanyi solution if and only if, for each (N, L), T (L) is a subset of this set.
Trees
The approach taken by Herings et al. [9] for tree-graph communication situations in definition (6) is to consider the function T a that assigns the set T a (L) of all possible rooted spanning trees of a graph (N, L). Each player i induces exactly one rooted spanning tree t i on N . Hence T a (L) contains exactly n elements. It has been shown (Herings et al. [9] , Theorem 5.1) that, for each i ∈ N , the corresponding average tree solution, given by (6), can be written as:
where p L S (j), j ∈ S, is the number of players outside S that j represents. Player j ∈ S represents player k outside S if k is connected to j and, on the unique path connecting j and k, all players between j and k are outside S. Because (N, L) is a tree, it holds that D(h T a ,S (L)) = S, and it is easy to check that:
Firstly, note that {p
Secondly, for each i ∈ S there is a unique t i ∈ T a (L), and player i is such that i ti(S) = i. This corresponds to the unit in the numerator of (10). Thirdly, for each t k ∈ T a (L), t k (S) is the subtree of t k induced by S. If i represents k, then S is a subset of the set of subordinates of i in t k so that i t k (S) = i. If i does not represent k, there exists a player j ∈ S who represents k and so i is a subordinate of j in t k . This implies that i = i t k (S) . Conclude that i t k (S) = i if and only if i represents k. Therefore,
. Thus, (10) holds.
Harsanyi trees of arbitrary graphs
In [10] , Herings et al. [10] consider the average tree solution with respect to a specific set of rooted spanning trees constructed as follows. Fix any communication graph (N, L). Let B = {B i } i∈N be a collection of coalitions satisfying:
1. For each i ∈ N , it holds that i ∈ B i and for some j ∈ N , B j = N ; 2. For each i ∈ N and each component K of the subgraph of (N, L) induced by B i \{i}, it holds that K = B j and ij ∈ L for some j ∈ N .
For a given graph (N, L), any collection B satisfying the above two conditions has the following property (see Lemma 3.2 in Herings et al. [10] ):
In addition B induces a unique rooted spanning tree, say t Proposition 2 Let (N, L) be any connected communication graph on N . A rooted spanning tree t r belongs to T B (L) if and only if, for each ij ∈ L, it holds that either i ∈ S r (j) or j ∈ S r (i).
Proof. Consider any connected graph (N, L), any t r ∈ T B (L) and any ij ∈ L. We have to show that either i ∈ S r (j) or j ∈ S r (i). Consider the unique player k ∈ N such that both ij ⊆ B k = S r (k) and for any other player q ∈ N where ij ⊆ B q = S r (q), we have k ∈ S r (q). Assume that k ∈ ij. Because ij ∈ L, condition 2 in the definition of B implies that there exists a successor of k, say i k ∈ s r (k), such that ij ⊆ S r (i k ) = B i k . This contradicts the definition of k. Conclude that k ∈ ij, which gives the result.
For the converse part, pick any rooted spanning tree t r of (N, L) such that for each ij ∈ L, it holds that either i ∈ S r (j) or j ∈ S r (i). We have to show that the collection of coalitions {S r (1), . . . , S r (n)} satisfies conditions 1 and 2 described above. Condition 1 follows from definition of S r (i), i ∈ N .
In order to prove that condition 2 is satisfied, we first show that the collection {S r (1), . . . , S r (n)} satisfies property (a). By definition of a rooted spanning tree, for each pair of distinct players {i, j}, only one of the three possibilities holds: S r (i) ⊆ S r (j)\{j}, S r (j) ⊆ S r (i)\{i} or S r (i) ∩ S r (j) = ∅. The first two possibilities guarantee that the first part of property (a) is satisfied. For the proof of the second part of (a), assume that there is a pair of distinct players {i, j} such that S r (i) ∩ S r (j) = ∅. Then, for each i c ∈ S r (i) and each j c ∈ S r (j), we have i c ∈ S r (j c ) and j c ∈ S r (i c ) and so i c j c ∈ L. Therefore, S r (i) ∪ S r (j) cannot be a connected coalition of (N, L). We conclude that property (a) holds. Now pick any i ∈ N and consider the subgraph (S r (i)\{i}, L(S r (i)\{i})) of (N, L) induced by S r (i)\{i}. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a connected component K of (S r (i)\{i}, L(S r (i)\{i})) such that K = S r (j) for each j ∈ s r (i). Then there necessarily exists a set of distinct players {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j q } included in s r (i) such that {S r (j 1 ), S r (j 2 ), . . . , S r (j q )} forms a partition of K. Hence the union of at least one pair of elements in {S r (j 1 ), S r (j 2 ), . . . , S r (j q )} must be a connected coalition in (N, L) since K is connected in (S r (i)\{i}, L(S r (i)\{i}) ). This is a contradiction with property (a), which implies that condition 2 holds.
We have the following corollary. (7) is the average of n contribution vectors and coincides with (6) . If (N, L) is the complete graph K N , then, for (v, L N ) ∈ C K N , the average tree solution defined with respect to T B (L N ) and given by (7) is the average of n! contribution vectors and coincides with the Shapley value given by (1). 
Proof. Consider any function T . Given that the average tree solution AT T can be written as (9), Theorem 2 can be proved by showing for each connected 
Consider the subgraph of t r induced by S. It follows that this subgraph is a forest.
Moreover for any pair of players in S belonging to distinct components of this subgraph, one player of this pair cannot be the subordinate of the other in t r . Because S ∈ C(L), there is at least one such pair of players incident to the same link in (N, L). By Proposition 2,
. By Proposition 2, there is ij ∈ L such that neither i ∈ S r (j) nor j ∈ S r (i). Therefore consider coalition {i, j} ∈ C(L) and t r ({i, j}), the smallest subtree of t r that contains {i, j}. It follows that i tr({i,j}) , the subroot of t r ({i, j}), does not belong to coalition {i, j}. Hence D(h T ,{i,j} (L)) ⊆ S as desired.
Constructing communication hierarchies
In this section a general algorithm, called Tree-Growing, is given for constructing spanning trees of a given graph. It is borrowed from computer science (see Gross and Yellen [7] ) and consists in growing a subtree, one link and one player at a time. Then, two particular instances of this algorithms will be considered and connected to the average tree solutions. The associated sets of rooted spanning trees have a meaningful interpretation, which is discussed in the concluding section.
Tree-growing algorithms
Consider a communication graph (N, L) which is assumed to be connected for the sake of simplicity. The algorithm introduced in this section can be easily applied to the connected components of a non-connected graph. A pair (S, L S ) with S ∈ 2 N \{∅} and L S ⊆ L(S) is a subtree of (N, L) if (S, L S ) is a tree on S. Denote by G any such subtree. For any given subtree G of a graph (N, L), the links and players of G are called tree links and tree players, and the links and players in (N, L) that are not in G are called non-tree links and non-tree players. A frontier link for G is a non-tree link with one endpoint in G, called its tree endpoint, and one endpoint not in G, its non-tree endpoint. By definition, the graph resulting from adding any frontier link of G and its associated non-tree endpoint to the subtree G is still a subtree of (N, L).
An essential component of algorithm Tree-Growing is the rule nextLink which selects a frontier link to add to the current subtree. For any subtree G of a graph (N, L), let F denote the set of frontier links for G. Then the function nextLink((N, L), F ) chooses and returns as its value a frontier link in F that is to be added to subtree G. Then, the selected frontier link and its non-tree endpoint are added to the subtree G. Note that the rule nextLink may not be deterministic, depending on how it has been specified to select a frontier link in F . After a frontier link is added to the current subtree, the function updateFrontier((N, L), F ) removes from F those links that are no longer frontier links and adds to F those links that have become frontier links. The pseudocode of Tree-Growing is given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 -Tree-Growing
Input: a finite connected graph (N, L) and a starting player r ∈ N . Output: a spanning tree G of (N, L) .
Let i be the non-tree endpoint of e 4:
Add link e and player i to G.
5:
updateFrontier((N, L), F ) 6: Return tree G.
Each different specification of rule nextLink creates a different instance of Tree-Growing. In the remaining part of this section, we describe two well-known instances of Tree-Growing called Depth-First Search (DFS) and Breadth-First Search (BFS). Both algorithms rely on the discovery order. For each subtree G of (N, L) induced by Tree-Growing, the discovery order is a listing of players in N in the order in which they are added as subtree G is grown. Once the spanning tree G has been returned by Tree-Growing, one can easily consider its oriented version t r , where the root is the starting player r specified as input in Tree-Growing. Henceforth, we will refer to t r as the output of algorithm Tree-Growing. For any output t r of Tree-Growing, the position of player i in the discovery order, starting with 0 for player r, is called the discovery number of i in t r .
In algorithm DFS, nextLink selects a frontier link in F whose tree endpoint has the largest discovery number. In other words, DFS chooses a frontier link incident to the most recently discovered player. If such a link fails to exist, then DFS "backtracks" to the second most recently discovered player and tries again, and so on. Therefore, DFS discovers players "deeper" in the graph whenever possible. In this way, DFS creates spanning trees containing maximal directed paths starting at the root r. Let DFS(L) denote the set of all rooted spanning trees of graph (N, L) that DFS creates. For any t r ∈ DFS(L), the discovery number of a player i ∈ N is denoted dfnumber(t r , i). Since nextLink is not necessarily a deterministic function, several different executions of DFS on a graph (N, L) can create the same rooted spanning tree t r . In such a situation, dfnumber(t r , i) can take different values depending on which region of the graph (N, L) is first explored.
In algorithm BFS, nextLink selects a frontier link in F whose tree endpoint has the smallest discovery number. In other words, algorithm BFS chooses a frontier link incident to the less recently discovered player. If such an link fails to exist, then BFS considers the second less recently discovered player and tries again, and so on. Therefore, BFS explores the graph by selecting frontier links incident to players as close to the root as possible. In this way, BFS creates shortest directed paths from the root to any other player (see Proposition 4.2.4 in Gross and Yellen [7] ). Let BFS(L) denote the set of all rooted spanning trees of graph (N, L) that BFS creates.
As an example, consider the undirected graph (N, L) on the left hand side of the picture below, where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and L = {12, 13, 24, 34}. Assume that DFS and BFS both have graph (N, L) and player 1 as input. Without any loss of generality, assume further that after one step of exploration, the tree is grown by adding player 3 and link 13. At this step of the execution of both algorithms, the current set of frontier links is {12, 34}. Because player 3 is the most recently discovered agent, DFS will select link 34 to grow the tree. Because player 1 is the least recently discovered agent, BFS will select link 12 to grow the tree and so on. As a consequence, the rooted spanning tree t 1 can be constructed by DFS but not by BFS, whereas the rooted spanning tree t 1 can be constructed by BFS but not by DFS. (N, L)
The next two sections compare the average tree solutions with respect to the set of spanning trees created by DFS and BFS respectively. When the communication graph is complete the resulting AT solutions are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal surplus division on Γ N .
DFS, Harsanyi Trees and the Shapley value
We start this section by proving that the set DFS(L) of all rooted spanning trees of the connected graph (N, L) that algorithm DFS creates coincides with the set of Harsanyi trees introduced in Herings et al. [10] . Proposition 4 Let (N, L) be a connected graph. Then t r ∈ DFS(L) if and only if t r is a Harsanyi tree of (N, L).
Proof. By Proposition 2, it is sufficient to show that t r ∈ DFS(L) if and only if, for each ij ∈ L, either j ∈ S r (i) or i ∈ S r (j). Proposition 2.4.1 in Gross and Yellen [7] establishes the only if part of this claim. Thus, it remains to show that if part.
So, consider any rooted spanning tree t r of (N, L) such that ij ∈ L implies either j ∈ S r (i) or i ∈ S r (j). Let (N, L(t r )) denote the underlying graph of t r , i.e. the undirected graph on N with link set L(t r ) = {ij : (i, j) is a directed link of t r }. Since (N, L(t r )) is a tree, any execution of DFS on (N, L(t r )) with initial conditions G = ({r}, ∅) and F = {ri ∈ L(t r ) : i ∈ N } will constructs t r . Consider any such execution and denote by π its discovery number, i.e. π(i) = dfnumber(t r , i) for each i ∈ N . Now, consider the deterministic version nextLink π of rule nextLink in DFS that is obtained by breaking ties according to π. More specifically, if F contains several frontier links incident to the most recently discovered player, then nextLink π chooses the link such that the non-tree endpoint is the player with the minimal rank in π. Denote by DFS π the deterministic algorithm that is obtained by replacing nextLink by nextLink π in DFS. By construction, if the (unique) execution of DFS π on (N, L) with initial condition G = ({r}, ∅) and F = {ri ∈ L : i ∈ N } constructs t r , then there exists an execution of DFS on (N, L) that constructs t r . In the rest of the proof, we omit to mention that algorithms DFS π and DFS are both run on (N, L) with initial conditions G = ({r}, ∅) and F = {ri ∈ L : i ∈ N }. We show that the execution DFS π on (N, L) returns the same output than the execution of DFS π on (N, L(t r )), that is output t r . Because L ⊇ L(t r ), the execution of DFS π on (N, L) is identical to the one of DFS π on (N, L(t r )) until no frontier link is incident to the most recently discovered player, say player i, during the execution of DFS π on (N, L(t r )). At that time, DFS π on (N, L(t r )) backtracks to the second most recently discovered player, whereas DFS π on (N, L) can grow the current tree by adding a frontier link incident to i if such a link exists in F . We show that F cannot contain such a link during the execution of DFS π on (N, L). By way of contradiction, assume that any such link ij ∈ L\L(t r ) belongs to F . By assumption, either j ∈ S r (i) or i ∈ S r (j). If i ∈ S r (j), then player j has already been discovered by DFS π on (N, L(t r )) (and so on (N, L)) so that ij has no non-tree endpoint at that step of the execution of the algorithm. This means that ij cannot be a frontier link, a contradiction. If j ∈ S r (i), there exists k ∈ s r (i) on the unique path between i and j in t r and k is not yet discovered. Thus ik is a frontier link, and DFS π on (N, L(t r )) cannot backtrack from player i, another contradiction. Conclude that ij ∈ F and cannot be chosen by nextLink π to grow the tree. Because ij was an arbitrary link incident to i in L\L(t r ), we obtain that DFS π on (N, L) backtracks from i. Continuing in this fashion for any other discovered player i during the execution of DFS π on (N, L(t r )), we obtain two cases:
(1) the execution of DFS π on (N, L(t r )) backtracks from i. Then, at this step of the execution of DFS π on (N, L), F will never contain links in L\L(t r ), (2) the execution of DFS π on (N, L(t r )) does not backtrack from i. Then, at this step of the execution of DFS π on (N, L), function nextLink π will select a frontier link ij in F such that ij ∈ L(t r ).
In both situations, the execution of DFS π on (N, L) will not use links in L\L(t r ) to grow the tree. Therefore, DFS π on (N, L) returns the output t r and we can conclude that t r ∈ DFS(L), as desired.
Combining this result with Proposition 3 and Theorem 2 immediately yields the following result. (N, L) is a tree, then, for each (v, L) ∈ C N , the average tree solution defined with respect to DFS(L) and given by (7) is the average of n contribution vectors and coincides with (6) . If (N, L) is the complete graph K N , then, for (v, L N ) ∈ C K N , the average tree solution defined with respect to DFS(L N ) and given by (7) is the average of n! marginal vectors and coincides with the Shapley value given by (1) . Moreover, the average tree solution AT T is a Harsanyi solution on C N if and only if T (L) ⊆ DFS(L) for each connected graph (N, L).
Theorem 3 If
BFS and the equal surplus division
In this section, we show that for each communication situations on C N with a complete graph K N , the average tree solution with respect to BFS(L N ) coincides with the equal surplus division given by (2) .
is a tree, then, for each (v, L) ∈ C N , the average tree solution defined with respect to BFS(L) and given by (7) is the average of n contribution vectors and coincides with (6) . If (N, L) is the complete graph K N , then, for (v, L N ) ∈ C K N , the average tree solution defined with respect to BFS(L N ) and given by (7) is the average of n marginal vectors and coincides with the equal surplus division given by (2) .
Proof. The proof of the first statement in Theorem 4 is immediate and is omitted. For the proof of the second statement, consider the complete graph K N and any (v, L N ) ∈ C K N . Note that for each r ∈ N , any player i ∈ N \{r} is at distance 1 of r since K N is the complete graph. Hence, for any r ∈ N , the execution of BFS on K N starting at r yields a unique spanning tree t r in which r is the predecessor of all other players. The set BFS(L N ) contains n such rooted spanning trees, one for each r ∈ N . The vector of marginal contributions in t r is then given by m
and m tr i (v) = v({i}) for each i ∈ N \{r}. Therefore, for each i ∈ N , we can write
which gives the result.
Concluding remarks
In [18], van den Brink provides a characterization of the equal surplus division that is comparable to the classical characterization of the Shapley value in the sense that both results differ only with respect to a property concerning null or nullifying players. In this article, we proved that these two solutions can also be related to each other by mean of the AT operator for communication situations with a complete graph. The proof of Theorem 4 provides a characterization of the equal surplus division in terms of an average of marginal contributions. The interpretation is similar to the usual interpretation of the Shapley value, except that the involved marginal contribution vectors are different. We already pointed out that these contribution vectors have a significant meaning from a hierarchical point of view. On the one hand, when the communication graph is complete, algorithm DFS can always go on by visiting some unexplored player. Any created spanning tree is shaped like a directed line, and DFS(L N ) coincides with the set of all n! such directed lines. The AT solution on C K N with respect to DFS(L N ) coincides with the Shapley value on Γ N . For any directed line, a player in position k in the line benefits from the information held and reported to him by the player in position k + 1, who in turn benefits from the information held and reported to him by the player in position k + 2 and so on. Therefore a player in position k in the line benefits from the information of each of the n−k players located downstream from him. Thus, the line architecture defines the most delegated type of communication hierarchy.
On the other hand, when the communication graph is complete, algorithm BFS starts from an initial player and can always visit directly any other player. Any created spanning tree is shaped like a (outward pointing) star and BFS(L N ) coincides with the set of all n such directed stars. The AT solution on C K N with respect to BFS(L N ) coincides with the equal surplus division on Γ N . For any star, the player at the center of the star benefits from the information held and reported to him by each other player. Thus, the star architecture defines the most centralized type of communication hierarchy.
The average tree solutions offers a new way of looking at the old economic debate about centralization versus decentralization. Advantages claimed for the two solutions have been extensively studied (see for instance Marschak [13] ). From the regulator point of view, the allocation choice between the Shapley value and the equal surplus division can be seen as a choice between delegation and centralization. The regulator knows the worth produced by the grand coalition that should be allocated among the players. Because communication can be costly, only hierarchical structures of communication can be considered to be efficient. No doubt that the worth ultimately achieved by any communication hierarchy is the same, because all agents eventually communicate and cooperate with each other. Nevertheless, the share of this worth that a particular agent can claim will typically depend on the communication hierarchy under consideration and on his/her position in the hierarchy. The regulator might not know which particular communication hierarchy has been used by the players for producing the worth of the grand coalition. In order to redistribute this worth among the players, he can focus on a particular class of communication hierarchies that he considers as plausible, and compute the average marginal contribution of each player over the communication hierar-chies in this class. This is the viewpoint as reflected in definition of the Shapley value, where each player obtains the average over all orderings of the players of his marginal contribution. If the regulator considers that the communication between players has been established by a delegated channel but does not know which particular one, he will allocate the value of the grand coalition among the players according to the Shapley value as the average marginal contribution vector over all these n! delegated channels. If the regulator considers that the communication between players has been established by a centralized channel but does not know who was the central authority, he will allocate the value of the grand coalition among the players according to the equal surplus sharing as the average marginal contribution vector over all these n centralized channels.
